This research analyzes the differences between municipal elections in large and mediumsized Russian cities (more than 100,000 citizens) and federal elections to representative bodies for the period from 2003 to 2018. The empirical evidence includes 210 municipal electoral campaigns in 119 cities and 4 federal legislative campaigns for comparison. We examine these differences using the notion of the party system nationalization, which is measured by comparing turnout and voting for political parties at different territorial levels in the same cities, and by party system inflation (with the use of the effective number of parties -an index that allows a comparison of election competitiveness at different administrative levels). Most of the cases are midterm municipal elections held separately between the federal campaigns. However, we draw special attention to the differences when federal and municipal campaigns overlap. The results showed some progress in the process of the nationalization of the Russian party system which is indicated by the rapprochement of the degree of competitiveness in the federal and municipal elections and, later, by the likeliness of electoral preferences at different territorial levels.
Introduction
This research compares electoral support for Russian political parties during elections for municipal representative bodies and for the national parliament. The results are primarily interpreted in terms of nationalizing Russia's party system since it is one of the key concepts in political science for explaining how the party system performs in geographic space.
In political science "nationalization" means "the unification of electoral support for political parties in different territorial entities of a state" [Golosov, Grigoriev, 2015, p. 128] . It is supposed that at the party system's dawn, political support is fragmented and segmented. Later, however, with the nationalization of the party system, which is "a broad historical evolution toward the formation of national electorates and party systems, party organizations and campaigns, as well as issues and party programs" [Caramani, 2004, р. 1] , political support becomes more unified and spatially homogeneous. The system is fully nationalized when parties have relatively the same support at federal and municipal levels and the system is not nationalized when parties get significant support only in some regions or are deprived of it or do not run at all in some regions.
A number of research papers on Russia's party system see polyethnicity, federalism (especially when Russia's non-party federal model [Riker, 1964] of the 1990-s-2000-s is applied [Ross, 2003] ), presidentialism [Shugart, 1992] and majority electoral system [Rodden, Wibbles, 2011; Harbers, 2010] as factors in the low nationalization. Another factor preventing nationalization is the communist legacy and features of the post-communist transition [Tiemann, 2012] . Given these factors Russia is a case of interest in examining party system nationalization.
In Russian political science, nationalization means "creating national characteristics of a party system that are replicated in all the regions" [Turovsky, 2016, p. 163] . In this research we expand the boundaries of this concept and include results of municipal campaigns instead of focusing on the regional level.
Russian research papers on party system nationalization have contradictory results: they talk about low nationalization when a single-member district system is used ("superpresidentialism is a plausible explanation for these results: in countries where executive power is not formed based on a parliamentary majority, but relies on a president, there are few reasons for candidates to join national parties, especially if there is no PR that provides important incentives for party formation" [Bochsler, 2010, p. 25] ) and about high nationalization when it comes to the proportional system. Golosov and Grigoriev examined the nationalization of the Russian party system using the results of the State Duma elections from 1993 to 2011 held with the use of party lists and discussed the following dynamics: the level of nationalization was initially high in 4 insignificant fall in the level of nationalization. Elections held with the use of a majority system showed an alarmingly low level of nationalization [Golosov, Grigoriev, 2015] . In general, it proved the results of previous investigations.
Nationalization can be measured in different ways. One of them is to analyze to what
extent the party is active in the regions. Within this framework a high level of nationalization would mean that a party stands candidates in all the country's regions which is the opposite to regionalization in which regional parties proliferate. The Caramani index is effective; this is the percentage of districts where a party stood candidates in [Caramani, 2004] . Such an analysis has a drawback: it measures whether the party stood a candidate but it does not measure the electoral support for candidates. One of the most popular nationalization measurements is the index by Jones and Mainwaring, which is the sum of the adverse inequality of the territorial support ratio of a certain party (Gini coefficient) which corresponds to the size of these parties [Jones, Mainwaring, 2003 ]. Nationalization can be also measured through the inflation level. This is calculated by the comparison of the levels of party competition at different territorial and federal levels. The bigger the difference in the competitiveness index at the regional and federal levels, the higher the inflation and the lower the party system nationalization [Simón, 2013] .
Often works on nationalization compare the results of national elections to regional diversity. We suggest another approach which considers comparing election results and voting behavior of the electorate at different territorial levels. We have already used such an approach when we compared regional and national legislative elections in Russia [Turovsky, Sukhova, 2017] . In the current research we focus on the municipal level. We believe that local elections are an important feature for the analysis of party system nationalization since the differences in voting in different parts of the country (reflected by the ordinary measurements of party system nationalization) overlap with the differences in voting at different territorial levels. Some research papers witnessed that on different levels of the electoral space, there are different systems of electoral behavior and party support, and different electoral characteristics emerge in accordance with ideological cleavages within the electorate [Aksenov, Zinoviev, Pleschenko, 2005] . In this paper we focus only on voting in larger cities, whereas voting in rural areas would undoubtedly reveal different features as noted in many other studies [Petrov, Titkov, 2000; Mikhailov, 2001 ].
Given the measurements of party system nationalization mentioned above and the features of comparison of local and regional elections we chose two methods of nationalization measurement. The first one compares the electoral support of parties in national parliamentary elections and in elections for municipal representative bodies. We also took into consideration party representation at the municipal level and the discrepancy between the numbers of parties represented at local and national level. An additional characteristic is the turnout comparison at local and national levels. Municipal elections in Russia are never centralized and their numbers are always very different. For this reason, we also consider the different scope of the sample for each year under examination.
The second method is the analysis of nationalization through party system inflation. We compare party competitiveness in the local elections with competitiveness during national elections. In order to measure competitiveness we use two indices: the widely-used effective number of parties (ENP) by Laakso and Taagepera (LT index) and also Juan Molinar's index (JM index) where competitiveness depends on the size of the leading party.
All local elections are compared with the previous and the next national elections in order to reflect the most relevant electoral dynamics. Both methods are used independently which helps to reach more relevant conclusions about nationalization considering sample limitations.
We used the results from party lists which tend to show higher levels of party system nationalization than in case of majority system. We describe in detail the municipal sample in the first section of this research.
Municipal elections in Russian cities: the use of proportional system
In this section we analyze the number of municipal elections in large Russian cities from 2003 to 2018, the frequency of the use of proportional (or mixed-member) system at this level and the tendency to hold municipal and national elections at the same time. Unlike regional and national elections, municipal elections use proportional system less. For this very reason it is impossible to compare the results using large samples. Meanwhile the spread of proportional system in municipal elections is very important in terms of the nationalization of the Russian party system as it shows similar voting patterns and voter affiliations across the state. can predict more local elections. We should note that the different number of campaigns will affect the validity of the measurements and will put some limitations on the research results. All the calculations were done by authors based on the data provided on Central Election Commission web-site www.cikrf.ru proportional system as a necessity for municipal elections but they secured their right to choose where and whether to use a proportional system, following the practice of the "manual" management of local elections.
Let us also look at the tendency to hold the national and local elections at the same time, which is a norm for elections for regional legislatures [Turovsky, Sukhova, 2017] . In 2003, there were no local elections under examination that overlapped with the federal ones. In 2007, there were two examples: in Vladivostok (a mixed-member system was used) and in Cherkessk (a purely proportional system). In 2011, there were 5 cities with simultaneous elections for both levels: Saransk, Grozny, Khimki, Nazran' and Magas. 2016 was the first year when the local and the State Duma elections were all held together. The sample of cities in each time period differs significantly, which may lead to some inaccuracies in our research. Nevertheless, we use the available data considering the limitations of each sample.
The number of candidates in the municipal elections
Another important feature of local elections is the differences in the numbers of political actors running for office at national and regional levels by way of party lists. These differences also reveal how parties are institutionalized at the local level. There are situations when the number of actors at the local level is much smaller than the number of those running for office in the State Duma. This can be also proved by the higher percentage of votes for the main parties at the local level since there are no smaller actors which could dissipate the votes. Low party activity at the municipal level can be explained by a number of factors. One of them is the weak party system development at the local level; another is low interest in municipal elections, even for large political parties; and many voters prefer personalized majority rule for local elections.
According to the polls "citizens tend to vote for a specific person rather than for a depersonalized 4 Here and further LT -effective number of parties by Laakso and Taagepera index, JM -by Juan Molinar index. points lower. We should also bear in mind that in some North Caucasus towns such as Nal'chik and Khasavyurt the turnout was equally high both at local and federal levels (above 85%) but it was much lower in all other cities at the local level. was reflected even more at the local level (however, only in some specific cities) than at the federal level. This difference can be explained by the phenomenon of strategic voting, according to which the voters prefer to cast their votes for more stable and major players in the federal elections, while they are more likely to vote sincerely in regional elections, see [Turovsky, Sukhova, 2017] .
The 2008-2011 electoral period: support for the opposition
The 2008-2011 municipal campaigns revealed positive trends for opposition parties ( Fig.   7 and 8 The maximum was reached in Salavat (76.78%), Nal'chik (76.05%) and Nakhodka (71.59%).
However, in the 2016 federal elections the turnout dropped in Salavat (56.8%) and Nakhodka Therefore, in this period LDPR was steadily losing its electorate in the municipal elections. This tells us that party system nationalization was successful given the similar results for the national and local elections. Thus, we can conclude that the nationalization of the party system was in progress. Today, Russia has low party system inflation since the difference between local and federal competitiveness is below 1 point. However, the trend for lower competitiveness was broken in the 2018 local elections because according to the JM index the elections were more competitive than the 2016 federal elections.
Analysis of simultaneous elections
In this section we analyze the municipal elections held simultaneously with federal ones since such elections have specific features. This aspect was a focus of our previous paper in which we concluded that in simultaneous elections United Russia gets a lower percentage at lower territorial levels than at the national level whereas the opposition parties get more support at the regional level [Turovsky, Sukhova, 2017] . The current research will show if we see the same trend for municipal and national elections.
Only Cherkessk and Vladivostok had simultaneous federal and local elections in 2007. 
Conclusion
In this section we compare the described periods by turnout, party support and competitiveness and draw conclusions about the nationalization of the Russia's party system.
We clearly see that local elections in Russia draw much less attention from the public. The analysis of differences between municipal and federal elections allowed us to identify some important trends. Third, the discrepancies in voting for parties at local and federal level were large and this brings us to idea that party system nationalization has not come to an end. However, this situation changed in 2012-2015 when the discrepancies became less significant. This trend continued in 2017 which means that party system nationalization increased. In 2018, owing to protest voting, this trend shifted and the gap between the local and federal level increases again.
As a result, the party system is not robust to social risks and party support depends on the changing social environment.
Fourth, the change of party system inflation tells us that party system nationalization is still successful in Russia. Comparing competitiveness at local and national levels, we concluded Fifth, simultaneous elections did not show the same results as in our previous paper [Turovsky, Sukhova, 2017] . When we compared regional and federal elections we concluded that United Russia gets less support in regional elections while the opposition performs better.
However, simultaneous local and national elections did not replicate this trend and showed no specific trend at all. This means also that opposition parties do not perform well on the municipal level and sometimes see this level as unimportant which leads to the concentration of their efforts on federal elections. Some smaller parties prefer not to participate in municipal elections whereas United Russia promotes its candidates at all levels. Thus, in 2016 it performed even better in the local elections than in federal campaigns.
To sum up, we see that the process of party system nationalization is a relative success in
Russia given approximately the same results at local and federal levels of elections. This is also reflected by party system inflation, measured by the competitiveness indices. The differences in competitiveness in the local and federal elections decreased in 2007 and it signaled the starting point of more successful party system nationalization. In part this happened because United
